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Abstract. Article is dedicated to the issues of accident scenarios analysis on the process of thermal power plants. The 
theoretical foundations of the graphical and analytical representation of Petri nets are shown. The article describes 
the steam cycle process and listing of its technology protections. A state model for power unit equipment and 
technological protections under the influence of changes in critical process parameters (steam’s temperature, 
pressure, level) is presented. Conclusions about the plans for further work in this direction are proposed.   
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I INTRODUCTION 
Thermal power plants are the basis of the 
generating industry in Russia and many other 
countries. Serious failures and accidents at thermal 
power plants not only lead to an aggravation of the 
electric power system operation, a possible 
deterioration in the quality and electricity shortage. 
Also power plant permanent equipment and ancillary 
equipment of thermal power plant can be damaged; 
building structures can be destroyed; staff can suffer. 
The process of electricity production at thermal power 
plants is a complex technology for energy conversion. 
This process is associated with a variety of potential 
hazards - burning fuel, using high-pressure steam; 
there are mechanisms with a large supply of 
mechanical energy, using grids and equipment from 
different voltage levels and others. 
Over the past 40 years in the Soviet Union and the 
CIS 30 major accidents occurred with the failure of 
more than one power unit [1]. Over 90 % accidence 
occurred due to failure of the main and auxiliary 
equipment. Such accidents do not bear the 
consequences of such accidents at nuclear power 
plants, but cause damage to millions of dollars. 
Power plants are designed with a large reliability 
margin, enough to withstand a single failure of 
equipment or personnel, but we can see that serious 
accidents still occur. Causes of accidents on the 
thermal power plants are usually not single negative 
factor, but a combination of several of them. A careful 
study of all important, but low probability negative 
factors that can lead to damage and loss of human life 
is the basis of modern approaches to the safety 
management in the industry. Risk analysis is a 
component of safety management. Hazards are 
identified, risks and risk mitigation requirements are 
established, technical and organizational solutions for 
reducing the risk are found out during the procedure 
of risk analysis. 
There are several quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment methods that that are applied to designed 
and already operated facilities. It is usually difficult to 
quantify the risk of a complex system such as a 
process of power generation at the thermal power 
plant, consisting of hundreds of items. Even 
qualitative analysis is complicated by the structural 
complexity that cannot be reduced to the serial and 
parallel structures. Mathematical apparatus of 
modeling Petri nets is suitable for such systems. Petri 
nets are widely used in the simulation of dynamic 
discrete systems. Graphical programming language for 
controllers SFC (Sequential Function Chart) was 
created and is based on the formalism of Petri nets. 
Stochastic and fuzzy Petri net modifications allow to 
model systems with high levels of uncertainty. 
The main system to counter the development of 
accidents is the emergency control schemes 
(technological protections). It is a complex control 
automatics, consisting of monitoring the critical 
parameters sensors, the logical unit controller and 
final elements that affect the process and prevent an 
accident. 
This article is dedicated to the possibility of using 
Petri nets for modeling of emergencies on the process 
of thermal power plants. 
.  
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II MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. Description of Petri net’s formalism 
Petri nets are bipartite directed multigraphs with 
two types of nodes (places and transitions). Petri nets 
are described by a mathematical expression 
ܥ ൌ ሺܲ, ܶ, ܨ,ܹ,ܯ଴ሻ (1) (1) 
where P ={p1, p2,…pn} is a set of places; T={t1, t2, 
tm} is a set of transitions; F is a set of arcs; W is an 
incidence-function; M0 is the initial marking. Arcs 
connect only nodes of different types 
F ⊂ ሺP ൈ Tሻ ∪ ሺT ൈ Pሻ (2) (2) 
Arcs (and places) are input if ones connect places 
with transitions (I ⊆ P×T) and are output if vice 
versa(O ⊆ T×P). One couple of nodes can be 
connected by more than one arc with different 
directions. 
Graphically places are pictured by circles and 
transitions are pictured by rectangles. Places, 
transitions and arcs form the static structure of Petri 
nets.  
Marking is responsible for the dynamic component 
of models based on Petri nets. It is a vector M=(m1, 
m2,…mk), where mi=M(pi). Marking changes 
discretely from the state M0 to the state M by the rules 
described below. Graphically marking are pictured by 
dots inside appropriate places. These dots are named 
“tokens”. Each place can contain zero, one or few 
tokens. 
The presence of tokens in places is a condition to 
make transition enabled. All places which are 
connected with arcs that lead to transition must have 
enough tokens to make it enabled. After that transition 
can be fired. Then transition is firing number of tokens 
equal number of input arcs disappears from 
appropriate places and tokens appear in places 
connected with firing transition equal number of 
output arcs. After transition had fired the Petri net got 
a new marking. Example of graphical presentation is 
shown on Fig.1. 
 
There is one token in place p1. This token makes 
enabled at once two transitions (t1 and t2) but only 
one of them will fire. After firing transition t1 or t2 
transition t4 will be enabled because place p4 will 
have a token. Firing of transition t4 will lead to 
situation when each of places p1, p2, p3 will get one 
token. Transitions t1, t2, t3 will be enabled. Transition 
t3 become enabled only because both of places p2 and 
p3 got tokens.  
There is an analytic presentation of Petri net in 
addition to the graphical representation. In Fig. 1 Petri 
net has 4 transitions and 4 places. Transitions have 
mapping on sets of input and output places:  
ܫሺݐ1ሻ ൌ ሼ݌1ሽ																	ܱሺݐ1ሻ ൌ ሼ݌4ሽ 
ܫሺݐ2ሻ ൌ ሼ݌1ሽ																ܱሺݐ2ሻ ൌ ሼ݌4ሽ 
             ܫሺݐ3ሻ ൌ ሼ݌2, ݌3ሽ										ܱሺݐ3ሻ ൌ ሼ݌4ሽ					ሺ3) 
ܫሺݐ4ሻ ൌ ሼ݌4ሽ										ܱሺݐ4ሻ ൌ ሼ݌1, ݌2, ݌3ሽ 
The incidence matrix can be contracted on the 
basis of mapping. 
 
The incidence matrix has number of rows that 
equals the number of transitions and number of 
columns that equals the number of places. Every 
position in matrix places value -1, 0 or 1. If place pi is 
input to transition tj that position [j, i] places value -1. 
1 is placed in the position in the case of place is output 
to transitions. 0 is placed in the position if there is no 
any connection between transition and place. 
Incidence matrix for Petri net from Fig. 1 is shown 
in (4). Incidence matrix describes structure of Petri 
net. Dynamic changes are described by transition 
matrix (5) and marking matrix (6). Transition matrix 
shows transition which will fire next. Every position 
in transition matrix represents transition. In (5) t1 will 
fire and will change initial marking M0 (6) to marking 
M1. 
Fig.1.  Petri net example 
ܹ ൌ ൦
െ1 0 0 1
െ1 0 0 1
0 െ1 െ1 1
1 1 1 െ1
൪  (4) 
ܶݎଵ ൌ ሾ1 0 0 0ሿ  (5) 
ܯ଴ ൌ ሾ1 0 0 0ሿ  (6) 
Marking change and state change of Petri net from 
Fig. 1 are determined by (7). 
ܶݎଵ ൈܹ ൅ܯ଴ ൌ ܯଵ   (7) 
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ܯଵ ൌ ሾ1 0 0 0ሿ ൈ ൦
െ1 0 0 1
െ1 0 0 1
0 െ1 െ1 1
1 1 1 െ1
൪ ൅ 
൅ሾ1 0 0 0ሿ ൌ ሾ0 0 0 1ሿ 
B. Description of process of thermal power 
plant  
 
Fig. 2  A simplified diagram of an oil-gas fueled thermal power 
plant steam circuit 
 
The same type equipment is shown once in the 
figure. Also there are not shown valves in the Fig. 2. 
Fuel 1 and air 2 are supplied into steam generator 
(boiler) 3. Heated steam enters into turbine by steam 
pipes 4. Turbine at Fig. 2 consists of three cylinders 
(high pressure cylinder 6, medium pressure cylinder 7 
and low pressure cylinder 8) that differ from each 
other by sizes and numbers of blades. There are also 
encountered turbines with one or two cylinders. 
Turbine rotates synchronous generator 9. Steam is 
partly taken for reheating by “cold” reheating pipe 
system 10 and then it is returned into turbine by “hot” 
reheating pipe system 5. Condensate comes into 
condenser 12 after turbine. Cooling water pumps 11 
provide enough flow of cooling water from cooling 
tower or special pond (not shown at Fig. 2) to 
effectively take excess heat and convert steam into 
water. Group of condensate pumps 13 create head of 
water that is required to overcome the low-pressure 
heater 14 and get to deaerator 18. Deaerator removes 
dissolved gases out of water and gets water prepared 
to new cycle of heating. Moreover there is a system of 
pumps 23, chemical water treatment 22 and deaerator 
19 that serves to compensate for the loss of water. 
Then feed water pumps 17 supplies feed water to the 
boiler through the medium-pressure heater 20 and 
high pressure heater 22. Also there are drain pump 15 
and pipes of process steam extraction 16. 
      Safety and effective work of such complex 
system as power plant steam circuit provides by 
SCADA-systems that control station-service 
auxiliaries and regulate parameters of process. For 
supplying safety of equipment ant health of station 
staff emergency control schemes (also named 
technological protections) are responsible. 
Technological protections react to significant changes 
of parameters and carry out shutdown of equipment or 
load rejection. Parameters that are controlled by 
protections are: 
 temperature, pressure, level of steam and 
water in boiler, turbine, condenser, deaerator; 
 temperature, pressure, level of oil in 
lubrication system that deliver oil to bearings 
of electric motors and synchronous generator, 
turbine; 
 vibration rate of turbine bearings; 
 water and hydrogen consumption in cooling 
system of generator; 
 operational condition of generator, pumps, 
induced fans, turbine; 
 condition of control keys on emergency 
control panel. 
There are list of groups of protections for Fig. 2.  
 Protections of power unit: 
o TP-P1 – protections that shutdown 
power unit; 
o TP-P2 – protections that reject load 
of power unit to 50% of the nominal 
power; 
o TP-P3 – protections that reject load 
of power unit to 30% of the nominal 
power or to idling; 
o  TP-P4 (L) P3 – local protections 
that regulate important parameters 
by opening and closing valves 
without changing behavior of power 
unit. 
 Protections of boiler: 
o TP-B1 – protections that shutdown 
boiler; 
o TP-B2 – protections that reject load 
of boiler to 50% of the nominal 
power; 
o  TP-B3 – protections that reject load 
of boiler to 30% of the nominal 
power;  
o TP-B4 – protections that shutdown 
fuel delivery to the boiler; 
o TP-B5 (L) – local protections of 
boiler. 
 
 Protections of steam turbine: 
o TP-T1 – protections that shutdown 
turbine; 
o TP-T2 (L) – local protections of 
turbine. 
 Protections of feed water pumps: 
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o TP-W1 – protections that shutdown 
feed water pumps; TP-W2 (L) – 
local protections of feed water 
pumps.  
 Protections of fuel delivery system: 
o TP-F1 (L) – local protections. 
 Protections of cooling water delivery system: 
o TP-C1 (L) – local protections.   
Structure and operating principle of the protections 
described in the operating instructions and other 
documents. But such description is not clear and does 
not allow to structure and study them from different 
positions. The next section presents a state model for 
power unit equipment and technological protections 
under the influence of changes in critical process 
parameters. The model is implemented in the form of 
Petri net. 
III RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Information that was given above has been 
systematized into and processed in the Petri net (Fig. 
3). The network presents several structural blocks. 
Left block represents the initiation of an emergency 
caused by a significant deviation from the parameters 
controlled by technological protections. Values of 
temperature, pressure and level of steam (water) can 
become less or more than allowable limits. It leads to 
changes in the right block. 
 
Fig. 3.  Petri net of states of power unit equipment in an emergency 
change of parameters of steam (water). 
Right block describes the equipment (boiler, turbine 
and feed water pump) set of states under the control of 
technological protections. Such states as normal state, 
loading by 50%, loading by 30%, safety shutdown the 
equipment and triggering of the local protections were 
identified for this model. 
Normal states each component of equipment in 
initial marking have token. Another initial token is in 
place p1. Depending on what transition will fire 
deviation occurs with one of the three parameters. 
The models for other critical characteristics 
(parameters of oil, vibration rate, operational 
condition of equipment and others) can be made in the 
same way. In addition to the visibility of the graphical 
representation of Petri nets analytical representation is 
interesting by enabling of creation software programs 
based on them. It was drawn incidence matrix with 
dimension 26×21 and initial marking for Petri net. 
Accident scenarios obtained in the form of sequence 
of firing transitions. 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
Energy companies applied great efforts for the 
creation of a modern safe and reliable electricity. But 
application of advanced technologies in the field of 
automation and informatization without the prior risk 
analysis does not always leads to effective safety 
improvement on the process. Using structures based 
on Petri nets allows to present sets of external events 
and internal states of the equipment as a dynamic 
multilevel model.  
Currently, authors are developing a software 
package for the analysis of the risk of accidents at 
thermal power plants on the basis of these models. 
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